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Abstract 
 
In one of the first analyses of its kind, this chapter examines how the tools and heuristics of 
narratology (the study of narrative) might enhance the study of anticipation. It assesses 
whether narratological insights into the ways in which stories narrate and readers read 
might enable us to tell better stories about the future and at the same time to become 
better readers of the possible worlds that such stories anticipate. Investigating the theory 
and praxis of anticipation across a broad temporal range of possible (fictional) and actual 
(real) world models and narratives (from antiquity to postmodernity), it scopes some of the 
pitfalls and possibilities opened up by treating the future as ‘storied’. It engages with the 
latest studies on cognitive narratology, possible worlds theories, and so-called ‘future 
narratives’, examining anticipatory narratives particularly relating to the environment and to 
the self. It argues that the stories we tell about the future, including our future selves, must 
be open, multi-linear, and multi-dimensional in order to avoid anticipatory backshadowing, 
which forecasts the future as a continuation of the past and present. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Narratology has made it clear that, while narrative can have any number of functions 
(entertaining, informing, persuading, diverting attention, etc.), there are some functions that 
it excels at or is unique in fulfilling. Narrative always reports one or more changes of state 
but, as etymology suggests (the term narrative is related to the Latin gnarus – ‘knowing,’ 
‘expert,’ ‘acquainted with’ ...), narrative is also a particular mode of knowledge. It does not 
merely reflect what happens; it discovers and invents what can happen. 
G. Prince, ‘On Narratology (Past, Present, Future)’, (1990:1) 
 
Narrative shapes our knowledge and understanding of the world – our past, present, and 
future. Narratology explains how narrative does this. Narratology has been characterized as 
a science, as a methodology, as a theory, and as a humanities discipline, combining both 
theory and praxis in the formal, rhetorical, and critical analysis of textual discourse across a 
broad spectrum of different genres and media (Meister 2014). Alongside its various 
theoretical schools (formalist, structuralist, post-structuralist, etc.) narratology has 
produced many sub-disciplines in recent years (cognitive, feminist, computational, etc.), 
prompting calls to eschew the singular term narratology in favour of the plural 
narratologies, so as to better convey the richness and multiplicity of this still expanding field 
(Herman 1999). 
 The study of anticipation in narratology (and its various narratologies) has therefore 
taken various different forms. Narratologists have shown keen interest in the way that 
anticipation functions in specific genres and narrative modes, such as counterfactuals in 
history and fiction (Dannenberg 2008), future utopian and dystopian fiction (Morson 1994), 
autobiography and life-writing (Bamberg 2011), and post-modern fiction, especially texts 
with experimental anachronic or polychronic temporalities (Richardson 2002). Perhaps the 
most important work, however, has focused upon the anticipatory dynamics of narrative 
itself. That is, analysis of the ways and means by which narrators and readers make sense of 
the possible worlds represented in stories (Ryan 1991), and by which they negotiate 
narrative prolepses (future anticipations and projections) in plots (Genette 1980). Indeed, 
theoretical and empirical narratological analyses of these phenomena have suggested that 
anticipation is one of the key motors of narrativity, that readerly competence in anticipatory 
processes is what drives narrative cognition and comprehension (Brooks 1984) at the most 
basic levels. 
 This chapter, then, investigates whether and how the tools and heuristics of 
narratology might enhance the study of anticipation. In particular it asks whether 
narratological insights into the ways in which stories function might enhance our narrative 
competences, so enabling us to tell better stories about the future and to become better 
readers of the possible worlds that future narratives anticipate. Assessing the theory and 
praxis of anticipation across a range of such possible story worlds and models, it examines 
some of the pitfalls and possibilities opened up by treating the future and its anticipation as 
‘storied’. 
 
2. Models as anticipatory narratives 
 
A story answers a model. 
But likewise a model answers a story. 
D. McCloskey, ‘Storytelling in Economics’ (1990:6) 
 
In anticipating the future, climatologists, economists, social and political scientists, and 
‘futurists’ in many other sectors employ qualitative (narrative) as well as quantitative 
(modeling) methodologies. Mathematical and statistical data, scientific and political 
analyses, all typically require some degree of narrative mediation if decision-makers and 
stakeholders are to process and publish them. In order for future forecasts to be produced 
and disseminated to politicians and public alike, complex information and models have to 
be translated into an accessible – which often means narrative – form. Only once complex 
data has been ‘storified’ can wider audiences read and thus evaluate their significance by 
assessing the probability and possibility of various options and outcomes. In this context, 
such stories function as metaphors of metaphors (meta-metaphors), re-describing and 
translating static models representing the real world into dynamic narratives representing 
possible or story worlds.  
The following narrative, based on models projecting a global temperature rise of 
+2C, provides a salient illustration of the way in which complex climatological forecasts can 
be translated into story form, plotted according to a nexus of cause and effect which seeks 
to persuade its readers that it represents a credible and probable anticipation of the future 
(cited in Bode 2013: 75): 
 
The heatwaves seen in Europe during 2003, which killed thousands of people, will 
come back every year with a 2C global average temperature rise. The Amazon turns 
into desert and grasslands, while increasing CO2 levels in the atmosphere make the 
world’s oceans too acidic for remaining coral reefs and thousands of other marine 
life forms. The West Antarctic ice sheet collapses, the Greenland ice sheet melts and 
the world’s sea level begins to rise by seven metres over the next few hundred years. 
A third of the world’s species will become extinct. 
 
This scenario, analysed in terms of the narratological concepts order, duration, frequency, 
voice, and mode (pace Genette 1980), demonstrates a sophisticated narrative form. In 
terms of order, the story here has a teleological and chronolinear structure, a clear 
beginning (rising temperatures), a middle (melting ice sheets), and an end (global 
extinctions). Under the rubric of duration, its ‘discourse time’ (the time it takes to read) is 
very much shorter than its ‘narrative time’ (the time span covered by the story): it takes 
only seconds to read but covers a period spanning several centuries. It necessarily, 
therefore, abbreviates the ‘frequency’ and temporal extent of the events it narrates: the 
melting of ice sheets and the rising of sea levels are iterative processes which take far longer 
than their description here allows. The voice of the extradiegetic (external) narrator, 
however, lends the authority of omniscience to this narration, assuring the reader of the 
actuality of these events, and even making the reader a virtual eye-witness of happenings 
which exceed the span of a human lifetime. Indeed, the mode of narration is such that the 
reader (or narratee) is invited to share the same ‘god’s-eye view’ of this global catastrophe 
as the narrator, to focalize events from a distant, dispassionate, and objective point of view. 
 Narratological tools (especially those borrowed from ‘possible worlds’ theory) throw 
up other meaningful insights into the narrativity of this climate change scenario. The 
‘principle of minimal departure’ (Ryan 1991), suggests that when readers encounter 
possible worlds (such as the future world forecast in the scenario), they assume that there 
are no significant differences between that and the ‘actual’ world, that its conditions reflect 
as closely as possible those of their own ‘reality’ – until the narrative forces them to make a 
cognitive readjustment and acknowledge a difference or departure from that actuality. 
Thus, if a story introduces a flying horse, readers will typically imagine a ‘real’ horse in all 
respects other than its wings. If a climate change prediction introduces an average global 
temperature increase, readers will typically imagine a variation of the real summer 
‘heatwaves’ with which they are already familiar. 
The climate change scenario here exploits this ‘principle of minimal departure’ in 
suggesting a temporal-causal connection between the possible future world it anticipates 
and the actual past and present world already familiar to its readers. It opens with a 
retrospective look back to the extreme weather events of recent history, using past-tense 
markers (‘seen … during 2003’, ‘which killed’) to recall a memory of prior real world 
experience. In doing so, the narrative establishes a set of initial conditions which 
paradoxically anticipate its readers’ pre-existing familiarity with a yet-to-be-experienced 
possible world; a world which it will go on to describe as an extension of or return to the 
past (‘will come back’). Having established this continuity through change from past to 
future, from familiar real world to unfamiliar possible world, the tense markers then shift 
into the present (‘turns’, ‘make’, ‘collapses’, ‘melts’, ‘begins to rise’). The use of the present 
tense here enhances the immediacy and thus the reality of this possible world, virtually 
locating the reader in the future as if it were the present. That is, until the imaginative limits 
of the temporal stretch of this future-in-the-present is reached (‘over the next few hundred 
years’) and a return to the simple future tense (‘will become’) is required.  
Indeed, as Fludernik’s work (1996) on ‘natural narratology’ has shown, English 
language narratives using the future tense tend to revert to the present and past tenses in 
this way, as soon as the future temporality of a scene has been set.  In Michael Frayn’s 
utopian future narrative A Very Private Life ([1968] 1981), for example, set ‘in the good new 
days a long, long while ahead’ (1981:5) the future tense quickly yields to the present and 
past (Frayn 1981:5-12, italics added): 
 
 Once upon a time there will be a little girl called Uncumber. Uncumber will 
have a little brother called Sulpice, and they will live with their parents in a house in 
the middle of the woods. […] One day she will hear the familiar clink of their tools on 
the other side of the wall, and their muffled talk and laughter, and she will say: ‘The 
animals are here again!’  
It’s all mixed up inside her head with some holovision programme she has 
seen. She thinks people live inside, and animals outside.  
And she takes everything so seriously. 
 
 In Frayn’s story, the unfamiliar future world that his narrative describes is introduced 
to his readers through a traditional story world setting (‘once upon a time’, ‘a little girl’, ‘a 
little brother’, and ‘a house in the middle of the woods’). A similar device is used in the 
climate change scenario to enhance the familiarity, immediacy, and realism of the possible 
world anticipated there. Familiar global landmarks (‘Europe’, the ‘Amazon’, the ‘Antarctic’ 
and ‘Greenland’) work to locate the reader in a recognizable and stable space – albeit one 
that is simultaneously in the process of being transformed. In Poli’s terms (2007: 3-4), the 
present space-time of a real world ‘chronotopoid’ is aligned here with a future possible 
world ‘chronotope’. Abbott characterizes this narrative device as the ‘future present’, and 
sees this conflation of tense in narratives set in the future as analogous to the ‘historical 
present’ – that is, the use of the vivid present tense to represent completed action in stories 
set in the past (Abbott 2008: 534). 
What is more, the temporal-spatial entry point for the reader of the climate change 
scenario – via ‘Europe’ – posits a particular geo-political point of view, a deictic (here and 
now) vantage point from which the reader has already seen killer heatwaves. In this move 
the narrative subtly appropriates the reader as an eye-witness to both the actual past and 
to the possible future impact of climate change. Thus, at the same time as it presents and 
invites the reader to share an omniscient narratorial viewpoint (a god’s-eye view of time 
and space embracing the past, present, and future of the world’s lands, seas, and 
atmosphere), the narrative is focalized from a particular fixed perspective in time and space: 
that of a European in the early twenty-first century – the reader’s own actual temporal-
spatial coordinates. Indeed, so firmly fixed is that external (homodiegetic) focalization that, 
as the narrative unfolds from prologue (the heatwaves of 2003) to denouement (mass 
extinctions a few hundred years hence), the global conditions of the narrator’s and reader’s 
now are anticipated as ongoing without variation or intervention, privileging the 
chronocentrism or ‘presentness’ of that point of view. 
  A narrative scenario of this type clearly does not offer an objective or definitive 
projection of the future, despite the quasi-omniscient and prophetic character of its 
narration. It is widely acknowledged, in fact, that narrative scenarios do not predict 
actualities but rather anticipate possibilities and probabilities as perceived from the present, 
from the now. As Staley affirms (Staley 2002: 38): ‘If a prediction is a definitive statement of 
what the future will be, then scenarios are heuristic statements that explore the 
plausibilities of what might be.’ Or, as the National Intelligence Council puts it (2004: 16, 
emphases in original): ‘scenarios are not meant as actual forecasts, but they describe 
possible worlds upon whose threshold we may be entering’. Such storified scenarios are 
therefore useful in processing what Bode (2013: 88, emphases in original) describes as ‘test-
runs of futures, or test-runs of known unknowns, revealing unknown unknowns, producing 
multiple evolutionary paths … [treating] the present as a nodal situation that allows for 
different continuations and … possible evolutions from this point in time.’ In effect, then, 
narrative scenarios extrapolate from what is known in the present into the unknown future, 
telling stories about possible worlds based on real world models. By better understanding 
the ways in which such stories work, using the tools of narratology, we might be able both 
to tell better stories about the future and to become better readers of the possible worlds 
that they anticipate and represent.  
 
3. Narratives as anticipatory models 
 
Books are indeed world models. St Augustine found the best model he could find for our 
experience of past, present, and future was the recitation of a psalm. 
F. Kermode, The Sense of an Ending ([1967] 2000: 52) 
 
While real world future scenarios and models can be shaped in narrative form, narratives 
and stories (both fictional and non-fictional) can similarly be viewed as shaping real-world 
experiences – including (perhaps, especially) those pertaining to the future. Narrative in and 
of itself can be seen as an anticipatory model, simulating (perhaps even stimulating) key 
cognitive processes involved in the activity of anticipation. 
Narratologists have long recognized that narrative constitutes an important heuristic 
tool for understanding the world, for making meaningful connections between past, 
present, and future events. As Boyd observes (2009: 137), ‘we will interpret something as 
story if we can’, ascribing significance and temporal-causal links to any incidents, applying 
rules of logic and probability to the actions and motivations of any agents, wherever 
possible. Taleb (2007: 62-84) describes this as ‘the narrative fallacy’, and associates it with 
‘our vulnerability to over-interpretation and our predilection for compact stories over raw 
truths ... our limited ability to look at sequences of facts without weaving an explanation 
into them, or, equivalently, forcing a logical link, an arrow of relationship, upon them’ (2007: 
63-4).  
In his Poetics, the first sustained work of narratology from the third century BCE, 
Aristotle pointed out that even when two incidents are not causally connected, where there 
is no necessary or probable sequence or relation between two events, we will nevertheless 
see a story if we can. To illustrate his point about this tendency towards narrativization, 
Aristotle offers an anecdote (‘the murder of Mitys’) in which a statue of a murdered man 
happens to fall upon and so kill his murderer (Poetics 9. 1452a 4-10). There is no logical or 
causal connection between the two deaths, yet they nevertheless combine to make a 
satisfying story. Aristotle is critical of the false ‘post hoc ergo propter hoc’ (after therefore 
because of) syllogism at work here, and is disapproving of the low aesthetic and affective 
quality that such a plotless ‘story’, in his view, possesses. However, his intuition that we try 
to make sense of the random incidents of real life by imposing a narrative structure upon 
them if we can is instructive, anticipating as it does an important focus of modern 
narratology – and a salient problem in anticipation and future studies. 
  For modern narratologists, particularly those working in the field of cognitive 
narratology, similarly maintain that we make sense of the world ‘narratively’. That is, we 
view events in the real or social world as if they were, are, or will be narrated, seeing 
narrative as a metaphor for life, and treating lived experience as ‘storied’. For Ricoeur 
(1984-1988) this metaphor has particular valence in the context of narrative identity and the 
stories we live, tell, and read about our past, present, and future selves. Refining Aristotle’s 
intuitions, Ricoeur maintains that the structured continuity of narrative provides a model 
upon which we base individual stories of personhood, assimilating our imaginative 
experience of fictive story-worlds with our lived experience of the real world.  
This has important implications for modelling how we live, tell, and read the future, 
and how we process anticipation as if narratively configured. For Currie (2007: 6) ‘the 
reading of fictional narratives is a kind of preparation for and repetition of the continuous 
anticipation that takes place in non-fictional life ... [giving] fiction, and the study of fiction, a 
critical role in the understanding of what lies outside of fiction.’ It might be objected that life 
is lived prospectively but narrativized retrospectively, making correlations between the 
processing of fictional (story world) and extra-fictional (real world) experiences unsound. 
Fictional characters such as Tristram Shandy and Emma Bovary similarly warn against 
forgetting to remember the fundamental differences between stories and lives. However, 
narratological studies into the phenomenology of reading demonstrate that even 
retrospective (‘once upon a time ...’) narratives are processed by their readers prospectively. 
That is, readers experience such narratives, as they experience the world, in a present mode 
of future-focused anticipation. For Brooks (1984: 22) stories require readers to respond to 
the preterite or past tense of a story world as if it were their own present and future. Thus, 
the experience of reading a story parallels the experience of living a life: incidents and 
events are read and lived in the present moment, pass into memory and the past, while the 
future remains open, the focus of hopes, fears and anticipations. As Ryan, in her study of 
the cognitive narratology of ‘possible worlds’, puts it (Ryan 2015: 83): 
 
Living a narrative prospectively means placing oneself in a concrete imaginary 
situation, monitoring its evolution moment by moment, trying to anticipate possible 
developments, and experiencing the disappearance of possibilities that comes with 
the passing of time but remaining steadily focused on the hatching of the future.  
 
By better understanding the ways in which such prospective reading and narrative 
anticipation works, then, might we better appreciate the subtleties and processes of 
anticipation in both story worlds and real world scenarios? Could narratological insights into 
the operations of anticipation offer useful insights into the way we read stories about the 
future? 
 
4. Prolepsis as a model for narrative 
 
This is the art of storytelling, so that by beginning in the middle of things through narration 
we return to the beginning and sometimes we anticipate things that are about to happen, as 
if through prophecy. 
Servius, Commentary on Virgil’s Aeneid (preface) 
 
In narratology, the dynamics of anticipation in telling and reading stories have long been a 
key site of interest and analysis. The earliest narratives in the Western canon (Homer’s epic 
Iliad and Odyssey from the 8th century BCE) already exhibit a range of techniques 
manipulating future time and temporality so as to achieve effects such as suspense, 
foreshadowing, and apprehension. Thus, the earliest extant body of literary criticism (the 
exegetical commentaries of the ancient Greek Homeric scholia dating back to the 6th 
century BCE) already show a remarkable level of sophistication in their analysis of these 
anticipatory narrative features (see Nünlist 2009). The ancient scholiasts exhibit a particular 
concern with what modern narratologists call ‘prolepsis’: that is, an ‘anachrony going 
forward to the future with respect to the “present” moment; an evocation of one or more 
events that will occur after the “present” moment … an anticipation, a flashforward, a 
prospection’ (Prince 1987: 79; see also Genette 1980: 40-78). Thus, the scholia assess the 
psychological and emotional impact upon ancient readers of a Trojan mother’s pathos-filled 
anticipation of the future awaiting her son (Iliad 22.473-515), or the foreshadowing of the 
death of Achilles (not included within the plot of Homer’s Iliad but frequently anticipated 
through prolepses in that text).  
In modern narratology, prolepsis re-emerged as a prominent topic of attention in the 
work of Genette (1980: 39-40) and Bal ([1985] 2009: 53–66), who saw this present-future 
linking anachrony as part of the wider anticipatory world-building practices of both 
narrators and readers.  Indeed, Genette (1980: 77, emphasis in original), saw the cognitive 
processing of narrative prolepses as depending upon – and thus offering insights into – the 
‘possible (or rather the variable) narrative competence of the reader.’ Such narrative 
competence, shaped by past and present experiences of processing anachronies in story 
form, is what enables readers to identify and respond appropriately to prolepses; to feel 
sympathy for a character whose death is imminent, to feel suspense or relief according to 
the anticipatory cues provided by the text. Higher levels of this narrative competence will 
also enable readers to discount what Genette terms ‘false advance mentions’ or ‘snares’ 
and even ‘false snares’ – the red herrings and false red herrings often found in classic 
detective fiction or the ‘black swans’ found in real world scenarios, whose actual future 
significance may not be immediately recognized or recognizable. Indeed, even while 
processing these various kinds of prolepses prospectively, the competent reader knows that 
their significance or lack thereof can only ever be fully evaluated retrospectively. The true or 
false red herring or black swan can only be correctly identified as such with hindsight. 
 Narrative anticipations of the future through prolepses therefore perform what 
Brooks describes as an ‘anticipation of retrospection’ – a process which turns out to be a 
miniature working model of the way in which narrative itself functions (1984: 23, emphases 
in original): 
 
If the past is to be read as present, it is a curious present that we know to be past in 
relation to a future we know to be already in place, already in wait for us to reach it. 
Perhaps we would do best to speak of the anticipation of retrospection as our chief tool 
in making sense of narrative, the master trope of its strange logic.  
 
Readers process any preview into the future that a narrator may provide by anticipating that 
at some future point in the narrative the substance of that preview will be revealed to have 
been meaningful or otherwise. As Brooks reminds us, we read a narrative ‘in anticipation of 
the structuring power of those endings that will retrospectively give the order and 
significance of plot’ (1984: 94). When readers encounter a narrative prolepsis, the successful 
cognitive processing of its anticipatory dynamics necessitates a complex interplay of past, 
present, and future – an interplay which Brooks, along with many other narratologists, sees 
as illustrating the way in which narrative itself is cognitively processed. According to 
Bridgeman (2005: 130), ‘The mental models relating to future action which are built in 
response to the explicit textual cues of prolepsis are part of a wider range of anticipatory 
and speculative activities by the reader.’ Given narratology’s claims that experience of 
reading a story parallels the experience of living a life, such cognitive processing of 
anticipation in narrative may yield crucial insights into the processing of anticipation in the 
real world. 
 
5. Anticipatory competence and cognition 
 
The gods accomplish many things beyond anticipation; 
The expected was not fulfilled 
And god found a way for the unexpected. 
That is how this affair turned out. 
Euripides, epilogue to the tragedies Alcestis, Medea, Andromache, Helen, and 
Bacchant Women 
 
For Genette, the successful operations of prolepsis depend upon readerly competence. But 
for Brooks, proleptic anticipation plays a much more fundamental role in reading and is in 
fact ‘our chief tool in making sense of narrative’ (1984: 23). Pioneering narratologists Wellek 
and Warren (1949: 419) had already ‘anticipated’ as much in their own account of what 
happens when readers process a story: 
 
In reading with a sense for continuity, for contextual coherence, for wholeness, 
there comes a moment when we feel that we have 'understood', that we have 
seized on the right interpretation, the real meaning. It is a process that ... proceeds 
from attention to a detail to an anticipation of the whole and back again to an 
interpretation of the detail. 
 
Indeed, as Augustine had noticed as early as the 4th century CE (Confessions 11.28.38; c.f. 
11.30.41), the cognitive processing of a narrative depends upon a complex synergy between 
the reader’s memory of what has passed, attention to the present moment, and anticipation 
(expectatio) of the future that is to come. According to Kennedy (2013: 30): ‘In the case of 
future processes in which we are involved, we measure them by anticipation, but only if we 
already have some experience of what we are measuring or a pattern we have already 
noticed so as to make prospective calculations.’ 
 Modern narratology confirms Augustine’s theory. From Kermode’s (1967) ‘sense of 
an ending’, Iser’s (1978) ‘protentions’, Eco’s (1979) ‘extensional operations’, to Brooks’s 
(1984) ‘anticipation of retrospection’, narratologists and literary theorists forward the view 
that anticipation is central to the processing of narrative fiction. Anticipation is understood 
as one of the principal dynamic forces that structures and motivates narrative. Anticipation 
allows, even drives, us to make temporal-causal connections between separate events, to 
make sense of the incidents of both real and story worlds by linking the past to a present or 
future moment, imposing a narrative pattern upon them. Currie (2007: 6) even goes so far 
as to suggest that ‘this anticipatory mode of being might be a characteristic ... of human 
being.’ 
Cognitive studies of reading and reader-response, including neuropsychological and 
empirical studies reach the same conclusion, that ‘the reader of a literary text must at one 
and the same moment recall, respond, discriminate, and anticipate’ (Miall 1995: 280). 
Research into the cognitive systems that process anticipation also tends to corroborate 
Augustine’s intuitions that memory, attention, and anticipation work synergetically in our 
reading of narrative texts, concluding that: ‘the affective or somatic markers that initially 
guide reading derive their significance from prior experience’ (Damasio 1994: 180). That is, 
our recall of past literary and extra-literary experiences shapes the processing of present 
attention and future anticipation when it comes to forming narrative competence in both 
story world fictions and real world scenarios.  Anticipation may be ‘our chief tool in making 
sense of narrative’ (Brooks 1984: 23) but it is a tool sharpened by retrospection.  
Paradoxically, it seems that the same narrative competences and processes that allow us to 
‘tell’ (and to read) the future in the first place prove to be a barrier in anticipating any kind 
of future that is not linked – through uni-linear causal-temporal connections – to the 
present and past.  
 
6. Chronocentrism and anticipatory backshadowing 
 
I have often noticed that we are inclined to endow our friends with the stability of type that 
literary characters acquire in the reader’s mind. No matter how many times we reopen “King 
Lear,” never shall we find the good king banging his tankard in high revelry, all woes 
forgotten, at a jolly reunion with all three daughters and their lapdogs. Never will Emma 
rally, revived by the sympathetic salts in Flaubert’s father’s timely tear. 
V. Nabokov, Lolita ([1955] 2000: 265) 
 
The implications of acknowledging this retrospective edge to the anticipatory processes of 
narrative competence are wide-reaching.  For it suggests that projections of the future in 
both textual and extra-textual situations, in both story world and real world scenarios, will 
necessarily be influenced by prior experience of the past and present. Future anticipations 
are therefore liable to exhibit what Morson (1994) describes as ‘chronocentrism’, an 
assumption that the future, like the present, is a product of the past. Morson warns that 
one of the major limitations of chronocentrism (a mode of ‘presentness’) is its occlusion of 
the probable difference of the future to both past and present, resulting in models of the 
future which merely extend the possibilities of the present (Morson 1994: 275).  
Employing a literary metaphor to describe what happens to real world scenarios 
when we situate ourselves in what Morson calls ‘epilogue time’, he argues that (1994: 278-
79) our views of the future, our ability to anticipate its differences and continuities to the 
past and present, prevent the projection of any real surprises or radical change. Like the 
narrator or novelist who adds an epilogue or postscript to his or her narrative text, those 
viewing the future from (or in) ‘epilogue time’ do not look for new plot lines or bifurcations. 
They anticipate a linear future evolving along already established trajectories; a predictable 
future that is predictable because it accords with pre-existing story scripts. For Morson 
(1994: 279): ‘Epilogue time allows the future to be viewed in terms of a form of anticipatory 
backshadowing that might be called preshadowing: the future is to be like the present …’ 
For Taleb (2007: 83), this presentness or chronocentrism lies at the root of the ‘narrative 
fallacy’ in future anticipations and forecasts, imposing upon us ‘a wrong map of the 
likelihood of events’, blinding us to the unexpected, the new, the improbable. 
 A variant form of this chronocentric ‘preshadowing’ can be found in association with 
the pre-existing story scripts through which readers seek to make sense of fictional story 
worlds or ‘possible worlds’. Ryan’s principle of ‘minimal departure’ maintains that readers 
will assume any story world essentially resembles their own unless and until pertinent 
differences are specified (1991: 48–54). Therefore, when readers negotiate the dynamics of 
possible worlds – both fictional and real-world – they will assume that the future essentially 
resembles the present unless and until any salient differences are made manifest.  
One of the problems associated with such preshadowing (and, indeed, with the 
wider principle of ‘minimal departure’) is the risk of anticipating a future in which we posit 
ourselves just as we are now. Through a failure of imagination we populate the future with 
our present selves and therefore with our present concerns and perspectives, shaped by our 
past experiences. As Bode argues (2013: 147): ‘Presentism occurs because we fail to 
recognize that our future selves won’t see the world the way we see it now … [and] this 
fundamental inability to take the perspective of the person to whom the rest of our lives will 
happen is the most insidious problem a futurian can face.’ 
Narratologists have had a longstanding interest in the presentism that readers 
typically encounter in ‘life narratives’– particularly in the context of autobiography and 
other first-person (autodiegetic) narrative modes which seek to remember and reconstruct 
the past from the perspective of the present. The story logic that emerges from such 
narratives requires the reader to elide a quasi-schizophrenic split between the ‘narrating I’ 
and the ‘narrated I’, to process a simultaneous (dis)continuity between the now of the 
experiencing and the narrating subject, and between the simultaneous past/present/future 
space-time (or chronotope) occupied by this split subject.  
In the Confessions of Augustine, one of the earliest narratologists and 
autobiographers, as in most life narratives, the present moment dominates. Remembered 
events from the past are selected for their significance in the light of the present. The re-
presentation of past experience turns out to be just that – a ‘making present once again’ – 
in which contingent events are transformed into a coherent plot, and meaningful temporal-
causal connections are retrospectively drawn between them. The future is encountered only 
proleptically as an ‘anticipation of retrospection’. The future horizon towards which the 
plots of autobiographical narratives head is the present now of writing. The narrating 
subject in autobiography can say ‘this is the man I was’ and even ‘this is the man I will 
become’ but the future anticipated here is already past.  
In the face of such teleological chronocentrism, modern and post-modern writers 
have challenged the idea that narrative can impose order upon the chaos of lived 
experience, and emphasised instead fragmentation, bifurcation, and polychrony in their 
own life narratives. In Virginia Woolf’s 1985 (posthumously published) Moments of Being, 
and Vladimir Nabokov’s 1966 Speak Memory, both the narrating and the narrated subject 
are encountered neither as wholly fixed nor as wholly protean characters, but as complex, 
contradictory figures, inherently surprising, and infinitely capable of improbable, 
unpredictable, and inconsistent behaviours.  
Such narrative models of the bifurcated subject (the narrating I and the narrated I) 
have important implications for modelling future scenarios involving the self. For instance, 
in saving and planning for retirement, in reducing an individual carbon footprint, in issuing 
an advance directive declining anticipated future medical interventions (see Huxtable 2015).  
In anticipating any future – but especially in any medium to long-term future – in which ‘I’ 
am concerned, the necessary characterization of ‘my’ self will impact significantly on the 
anticipatory processes through which future scenarios are modelled and understood. What 
is more, the narratological comprehension and configuration of the bifurcated subject in 
such future scenarios (what we might describe as the ‘anticipating I’ and the ‘anticipated I’) 
applies not only to the first person singular (I, me) but to the first person plural (we, us). 
Narratology thus helps to show that the split subject plays a significant function in shaping 
the dynamics of anticipation in accounts not only of ‘my’ personal future but in ‘our’ 
collective social future(s). Indeed, in any future narrative in which we ourselves play a 
character role – or roles. 
There is significant complexity involved in cognitively processing ourselves and 
others as bifurcated subjects in narrative world models. Yet wider exposure to and 
engagement with first person narratives and scenarios – both fictional and non-fictional – 
which offer the opportunity to reflect our bifurcated selves to ourselves might serve to 
expand our own temporal horizons and anticipatory competences. Immersive virtual reality 
experiences, and even personal digital archives such as Facebook, Snapchat Memories, offer 
new ways for us to narrativize our own lives as part of a multi-linear story-world – and 
crucially, to see ourselves as the-same-yet-different subject(s) occupying that world (or 
worlds). Such exposure to the complexity of our different-yet-same past and present selves 
may prepare us to better appreciate and anticipate the complex ontological status of our 
future selves too, to anticipate our participation in future worlds in which we can imagine 
ourselves (both individually and collectively) neither as wholly fixed nor as wholly unfixed 
characters. By developing this aspect of our narrative competence(s) we may not necessarily 
learn to avoid populating the future with our present selves and our present concerns and 
perspectives, but we may find it easier to recognize the implicit bias of such ‘presentness’ 
and to pay attention to the blindspots and prejudicial preshadowing it entails. 
 
7. The future narratives and narrative future(s) of narratology and anticipation 
 
All stories and narratives tell of events past, present, or yet to come. 
Plato, Republic (3.392d) 
 
The same sorts of narrative (in)competencies that shape future scenarios involving the self 
also pertain to larger social and global future scenarios. Here too, chronocentric 
preshadowing which assumes the future will be like the present, alongside principles of 
minimal departure which assume the future will be familiar (and again, essentially like the 
present), impose limitations upon our capacity to imagine possible future worlds that are 
significantly different from the present. As Bode complains (2013: 100): ‘being able to think 
about the future … is perpetually spoilt by our present incapacity to be sufficiently 
imaginative, to think the unexpected, to factor in surprise, discontinuities, reversals, tipping 
points, etc.’ How then might we use narratives and narratological tools to avoid 
chronocentrism and anticipatory backshadowing or preshadowing when thinking about the 
future? Morson offers us some possible ways forward. He suggests that (1994: 282): 
 
We are all captives of our moment, and we live on a small temporal island. Complex 
moral thinking, informed by a rich sense of temporality, may liberate us from the 
tyranny of the present instant. The imagination of sideshadows and the process of 
dialogue with alternatives may expand our temporal horizons and make us more 
attentive to historical opportunity.  
 
Morson advocates ‘complex’ thinking and the imaginative engagement with alternative 
narrative models such as counterfactuals (or ‘sideshadows’, as he describes them). Defined 
by narratologists as ‘a principle of divergence that makes visible a vast horizon of alternative 
stories’ (Ryan 2014: 735), the counterfactual is often viewed as a postmodern phenomenon 
but it actually has an ancient pedigree. Speculative and counterfactual narratives 
considering a possible world in which characters may have behaved otherwise and events 
may have happened differently can be traced back to first century BCE Rome, where the 
historian Livy wonders what might have happened if Alexander the Great had lived longer 
and, having subjugated Asia, had then turned his attentions to Europe and to the might of 
Rome (Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 9.16-18). 
Such ‘what if’ speculation frequently appears in fictional narrative too, when 
narrators and characters imagine alternative futures – and alternative stories – for 
themselves, positing possible world scenarios within their own story worlds. In these 
historical and novel counterfactuals the conjectural divergence from the actual story line 
and story world (from what ‘really’ happened in the history or fiction) is clearly delineated. 
The alternatives are processed as speculative ‘sideshadows’, clearly lacking the substance 
and reality of the main (hi)story. Following the story logic imposed by such counterfactuals, 
the reader will typically process the sideshadow as a diversion, as an ancillary narrative of 
lesser significance than the primary plot line from which it branches out. The readers of 
James Thurber’s 1939 short story ‘The Secret Life of Walter Mitty’, however immersed they 
may be in the possible worlds configured in Mitty’s vividly heroic counterfactual daydreams, 
can readily identify the ‘actual’ possible world of the story in which Mitty performs a series 
of mundane domestic errands  for his wife.  
Imagining counterfactual possible worlds alongside (and even within) actual (or 
mimetically ‘real’) possible worlds may help to exercise the ‘complex moral thinking’ that 
Morson advocates as a correction to chronocentrism. However, its enrichment of our 
‘temporal horizons’ is clearly limited. Despite the plot bifurcations and ostensibly multilinear 
narratives produced by counterfactual fantasies and stories, the reader is directed to 
privilege one central story line and one unified story world, focusing memory and 
anticipation upon the actual, even while focusing attention upon the counterfactual. This 
entails remembering that Mitty is driving his car too fast while he is fantasizing about 
piloting a seaplane, anticipating that while Mitty leans against a wall, smoking – and 
imagining himself about to face a firing squad – his wife will return any moment, and Mitty 
will have to face her ire for having forgotten to buy dog biscuits. That story world and its 
temporality are ever present and dominant in terms of their deictic (here and now) force.  
Indeed, this is one of the more persistent narratological tropes of counterfactual 
speculation in both history and in fiction: whatever branching path is projected out from the 
here and now ultimately returns there. Historical counterfactuals, for example, imagine past 
events following a different path (Germany winning the second-world war is one favourite 
motif, as in Philip K. Dick’s 1963 Man in the High Castle, and Robert Harris’ 1992 
Fatherland). But that alternate path will typically loop back to return the story world to a 
familiar present. In a move initiated by Livy in the first century BCE, counterfactual histories 
show us the unreality of what might have happened but chronocentrically privilege the 
present product of what really did happen. Alexander might have attacked Rome, but he 
would have been defeated – ensuring that Rome’s long term future (Livy’s present) would 
not have played out any differently. Hitler’s Germany and its allies might have triumphed, 
but the Cold War and Europe’s longer term future (our present) would not have played out 
very differently. Morson (1994) describes this influence of the future present moment upon 
re-tellings of the past as ‘backshadowing’, and if we extrapolate the principles of such 
historical counterfactual thinking to future anticipations, we can forecast an analogous 
effect. The present casts a shadow upon the future, limiting our ability to see differences 
and discontinuities – that is, preshadowing. 
We may usefully consider a brief counterfactual sideshadowing of our own here. For 
it is worth noticing that Morson does not include utopian or dystopian narratives among his 
recommended reading for enhanced anticipatory competence. Elsewhere he argues that 
(1994: 266-67): ‘Utopias set in the future almost always engage in what might be called 
anticipatory backshadowing: the author invites readers to imagine how their world will look 
when viewed by their counterparts in the utopia to come. He passes certain judgements on 
his own time by projecting them forward onto people who will “look backward.”’ Bode 
offers a similar rationale for dismissing utopian fiction as a model for future anticipation, 
arguing that (2013: 11): ‘The basic form of utopian narrative is nothing but the narration of a 
future which has already happened – and therefore grammatically as well as narratologically 
the narrative of a(n) (imagined) past. They present the future as past space: closed, 
determined, with uni-linear action.’ 
However, there are some narrative forms which do promise to foster the sort of 
complex future thinking that is required to see the future differently, free of – or at least 
alert to the existence thereof – the blindspots and limitations of ‘anticipatory 
backshadowing’. In some modern science fiction inspired by scientific theories of multiple 
parallel universes (or the ‘multiverse’ of quantum physics), obvious distinctions between 
actual and counterfactual story lines are dissolved. The multiverse or metauniverse 
hypothesis that any and every possibility may be actualized in many possible worlds makes 
it increasingly difficult for readers to orient themselves in these story worlds according to 
fixed or stable time-space coordinates or chronotopes. In fact, the fundamental principles 
underlying the ways that readers perceive space and time may be compromised still further 
in a multiverse model where time itself can possess different properties in different 
universes.  
Since H. G. Wells first anticipated the multiverse in his 1923 novel, Men Like Gods, in 
which the use of a ‘paratime machine’ makes it challenging for the reader to identify any 
central deictic here and now across multiple parallel worlds, such narratives have 
proliferated, finding film, television, anime, and interactive online gaming all conducive 
media for the multiverse or metaverse story form. Although several narratives in this genre 
straightforwardly evoke parallel or meta-worlds which are more or less clearly defined as 
alternatives to a central story world, and thus elicit the sort of sideshadowing effects 
typically seen in counterfactual narratives, others do embrace the complexity and 
opportunity offered by narrating across multiple story worlds. If Morson’s theory is correct, 
that ‘we live on a small temporal island’ and are inclined to project shadows of the present 
onto the past and future, then exposure to such narrative complexity could help to increase 
our readerly competences in general, and our anticipatory competences in particular – both 
within fictional story worlds and real world scenarios. Cognitive and psychological studies 
into the phenomenology of reading narrative and of experiencing story worlds have 
consistently shown that levels of understanding and enjoyment of stories correlate to the 
reader’s previous encounters with narrative intricacy (Hogan 2003). Faced with narrative 
complexity, uncertainty, and even incoherence and contradiction, experienced readers are 
able to supply familiar scripts and schemata to help them make surprising and improbable 
connections. The wider and more varied their past experience of fictional story worlds, the 
greater their competence (and pleasure) in finding strategies to make sense of the strange 
and unfamiliar, and the more nuanced their anticipatory aptitudes (Schneider 2005). 
Whether or not they are explicitly treated as such within the narrative frame, plural 
story multiverses (as distinct from unified, single story worlds) also appear in postmodern 
narratives which present multiple, mutually contradictory and incompatible tellings of the 
same story or event, with no obvious cues as to which version may be the factual and which 
the counterfactual (as in John Fowles’ 1969 The French Lieutenant’s Woman, or Kate Atkins’ 
2013 novel Life after Life; and in films like Run Lola Run (1998), or Coherence (2013)).  
Richardson, in his influential analysis of narrative time in postmodern and non-mimetic 
fiction (2002) has shown that the consciously unrealistic (also described by narratologists as 
‘anti-mimetic’, ‘non-mimetic’, or ‘unnatural’) treatment of time and temporality 
encountered in many postmodern narratives radically destabilizes traditional notions of 
story and story worlds. In Richardson’s account (2002: 48-49; c.f. Fludernik 1996: 333-37):  
 
In these texts, there is no single, unambiguous story to be extrapolated from the 
discourse, but rather two or more contradictory versions that seriously vitiate the 
very notion of story (histoire) insofar as it is conceived as a single, self-consistent 
series of events that can be inferred from the discourse.  
 
The tools of classical narratology must be refined and theories of reader-response revised if 
we are to analyse effectively the anticipatory dynamics at work in these postmodern 
narratives. This is because such postmodern novels treat past, present and future, alongside 
memory, attention, and anticipation, very differently to pre-modernist fiction. According to 
Herman’s postclassical narratology (2002: 220-250), novels which employ such ‘polychronic 
narration’ resist recourse to any one dominant time or story line, to any singular deictic 
‘here and now’, or to any unified chronotope. This entails ‘a mode of narration that 
purposely resists linearity by multiplying the ways in which narrated events can be ordered’, 
incorporating a kind of ‘fuzzy temporality’ (Herman 2002: 212-14).  
Classical narratology, following the intuitions of Aristotle and the refinements of his 
poetics by the Russian Formalists in the early twentieth century, assumes that however 
intricately plotted a narrative may be (however complex its anachronies, its flashbacks and 
flashforwards, or its counterfactual bifurcations) the reader is able to make sense of it by 
cognitively reconstructing its ‘real’ chronolinear story (also known as fabula or histoire). The 
narratee (the reader or viewer) processes narrative complexity and multiplicity by 
attempting to reduce a temporally intricate pattern of incidents into a chronological series 
of causally related events. Thus, in Forster’s famous definition, a story is ‘a narrative of 
events arranged in their time-sequence … “The king died and then the queen died,” is a 
story’ (Forster 1927: 86), albeit not one with much narrative richness. 
However, in a postmodernist narrative we might encounter a story in which a royal 
couple dies in 1066. And then dies in 1060. And then dies in 2017. In Atkinson’s 2013 novel 
Life After Life, for example, the protagonist dies in November 1930. She is stillborn on 11 
February 1910. She dies in June 1914. She dies in January 1915. Ensuing iterations of her 
multiple lives see her die in different ways and at different times, again and again. This self-
contradictory chronologically illogical pattern prevents readers from reconstructing a story 
out of ‘events arranged in their time-sequence’. It simultaneously prevents them from 
identifying any one life story as the ‘actual’ or principal story line from which the other lives 
branch out as ‘counterfactuals’. In this plural story world (or rather, multiverse) all lives are 
possible and all alternatives equally probable. As Heise observes (1997: 55): ‘Postmodernist 
novels … project into the narrative present and past an experience of time which normally is 
only available for the future: time dividing and subdividing, bifurcating and branching off 
continuously into multiple possibilities and alternatives’. The readerly competence required 
to process such narratives, to see past, present and future as if open, contingent, and multi-
linear (rather than closed, determined, and uni-linear) may open up new possibilities in the 
way that we process future anticipations too.  
 
8. (In)Conclusion and Summary 
 
Narrative space is now plastic and manipulable. It has become heterogenous, ambiguous, 
pluralized. Its inhabitants no longer appear to have an irrefutable or essential relation to any 
particular space. Rather, space opens up as a variable and finally indeterminate feature of 
any given world. 
A. Gibson, Towards a Postmodern Theory of Narrative (1996: 12) 
 
Bode characterizes such postmodern fiction as a distinctive type of ‘future narrative’ (Bode 
2013). Not because its story multiverses represent future spatio-temporal worlds and 
chronotopes, but because they stage ‘the fact that the future is a space of yet unrealized 
potentially, or, technically speaking, a “possibility space”’ (Bode 2013: 1; cf. Boyd 2009: 
122). Bode defines future narratives as those which are open-ended and multi-linear, with 
nodes producing bifurcations, multi-linear plots, and multiple continuations. Such narratives 
are supposed to be found in children’s ‘choose-your-own-adventure’ books and other 
interactive fiction, postmodern novels (especially those where the reader chooses the 
reading order), multiplayer online gaming, and even the amusement park rides based on 
popular film narratives (see Abbott 2008). These future narratives are also found in the 
anticipatory story scenarios used by climatologists, social and political scientists, and other 
futurists (Bode 2013: 2 specifically mentions ‘insurance companies and world climate 
change experts, [and] peak oil aficionados’).  
The postmodern novel, in Bode’s analysis, is a particularly valuable type of future 
narrative because it ‘testifies to the new idea that – though the present can be seen as the 
outcome of relatable cause-and-effect chains – it is also ‘only’ a probable state, alongside 
which other probable (or equally improbable) states can then be imagined’ (Bode 2013: 
206). The postmodern novel thus helps to mitigate against the negative preshadowing 
effects of ‘presentness’ by affirming that the present itself is not singular but plural, not 
closed but open, not linear but complex. More like the future than the past, in fact.  
Bode’s claim that this is a ‘new’ idea may be challenged by the evidence of such 
openness, multiplicity, and complexity in ancient narratives (such as the plots of Greek 
tragedy) and in early novels (such as Henry Fielding’s Tom Jones (1749) and Laurence 
Sterne’s Tristram Shandy (1759)). However, Bode’s championing of this kind of ‘future 
narrative’ thinking and its heuristic value as a model for anticipation is supported by recent 
work in the social and political sciences. His innovative theory and poetics of future 
narratives in literature finds an important corollary in Uprichard’s work on ‘narratives of the 
future’ in social science. For Uprichard (2011: 104) the objects of anticipation and future 
studies: ‘are dissipative, open, non-linear, multi-dimensional, social systems which are 
situated in time and space’. She maintains that the stories we tell about the future must 
therefore be themselves open, multi-linear, and multi-dimensional – plural rather than 
singular.  
The same insistence upon the importance of multiplicity and plurality appears in 
studies concerned with the future of global sustainability (Costanza, Graumlich and Steffen 
2007: 419-21): 
 
The environment, society, and the economy each represent complex systems 
characterized by nonlinearities, autocatalysis, time-delayed feedback loops, 
emergent phenomena, and chaotic behavior […] to achieve the outcomes we desire, 
it will be necessary to incorporate simultaneously several different perspectives, 
[and] … the essential theories, tools, and knowledge of multiple disciplines. 
 
Among the multiple perspectives and multi-interdisciplinary tools forecast here as necessary 
to achieve the effective anticipation of future scenarios and models for these complex 
environmental, social, and economic systems, future narratives and narratology can play a 
meaningful part. What we need in the future and for the future, perhaps, is not just a closer 
dialogue between narratology and anticipation studies, but a multiplicity of dialogues 
between narratologies and anticipations – plural: dialogues with cognitive narratologists 
and possible worlds theorists, with climatologists, economists, social and political scientists; 
readings of counterfactuals, post-modern fiction, and in particular so-called ‘future 
narratives’ with their non-linear, bifurcating, open plots and possibilities. Through such 
dialogues and readings we might find mutually enriching plots for the narrative future(s) of 
anticipation. 
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